SFMEDIC CHAT - Dinar Speculator

Chat 12-28-2009 (Evening Chat)

OK IF YOU ALL REALLY REALLY WANT TO KNOW WHAT WE THE U.S. GOVT THINKS IS GOING ON IN IRAQ, THEN I WANT YOU ALL TO GO TO THE POST I JUST PUT IN THE FORUM. IT IS VERY VERY LONG... 4 PARTS, BUT IT EXPLAINS WHAT WE FEEL MALIKI HAS DONE WRONG, AND OUR FEELINGS ABOUT THE CURRENT GOVT AND CORRUPTION. IT EXPLAINS WHY THE VIOLENCE HAS NOT CURBED, DUE TO THE LACK OF THE GOI PUTTING PEOPLE TO WORK AND CREATING JOBS AND REDUCING UNEMPLOYMENT. IT IS AN OUTSTANDING UPDATED REPORT BY THE CSIS. I GOT THIS FROM TONYA. I SPENT ALL DAY READING IT AND STUDYING IT. I CAN TELL YOU THIS RIGHT NOW. I JUST GOT A REPORT FROM A FRIEND IN IRAQ. HE HAS BEEN IN AND OUT OF HIGH LEVEL A.I. MEETINGS ALL DAY AND MORE SCHEDULED TOMORROW ABOUT IRAQ. HE DID NOT BREACH ANY SECURITY VIOLATIONS IN OUR DISCUSSION, BUT IRAQ WANTS OUR HELP. WE ARE NOT GOING TO GIVE IT WITHOUT A COST TO IRAQ. THIS WAS EVIDENCED YESTERDAY BY THE ANONYMOUS MP WHO SAID THAT THEY ASKED FOR THE US TO TAKE OVER THE SECURITY FILES, BUT THE US SAID ONLY IF WE GET THE ECONOMIC FILE ALSO. THAT MEANS BASICALLY THAT IRAQ WOULD BE THE 51ST STATE. WE WILL DO RIGHT BY THE IRAQI PEOPLE. WE WOULD GET THEM OUT OF POVERTY, AND WOULD FORCE THE PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT SORELY NEEDED, AND ELIMINATE THE CORRUPTION THAT IS CRIPPLING THE IRAQI GOVT AND COUNTRY. SEE AND YOU ALL THOUGHT I JUST SAT AROUND AND DID NOTHING ALL DAY. LOL! ALL DONE.

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This is the article that SFM is referring to in the above chat.

Iraq: Creating a Strategic Partnership
By Anthony H. Cordesman, Adam Mausner, and Elena Derby
Dec 15, 2009

Executive Summary

Iraq is changing rapidly, although the outcomes of many of these changes remain unclear. The country faces major challenges in many areas—ranging from quelling the ongoing violence to achieving political accommodation and economic stability. Each of these challenges is critical to its future security and stability:

* Defeat the threat posed by the remnants of the Sunni insurgency, neo-Ba‘athists and Shi‘ite militias.
* Deal with the risk of new forms of ethnic and sectarian violence——especially ethnic conflict between Arab, Kurd, and other minorities in the North.
* Create effective Iraqi security forces that can fully replace U.S. forces, defeat or reduce the various insurgent and terrorist groups to acceptable levels of activity, enforce the rule of law, and grow strong enough to ensure Iraq’s security from threats or pressures from neighboring states.
* Carry out an election in early 2010 involving a major realignment of virtually all the political factions in Iraq, especially Arab Shi‘ites and Arab Sunnis, and then restructure the Iraqi government to both reflect the results of the election and create a level of effective governance that can bring together all of the nation’s major factions.
* Accelerate the slow pace of political accommodation and meet the need for stable political compromises between each major faction in order to rebuild full national unity over time.
* Find a new balance between central, provincial, and local governance that effectively serves the needs of the Iraqi people, aids political accommodation, builds capacity, reduces corruption, and shifts the climate from one dominated by counterinsurgency to one focused on the rule of law.
* Cope with the challenges of poverty, unemployment, and underemployment; poor distribution of income; and key problems in the agricultural, industrial, and service sectors than affect large portions of the population.
* Move Iraq toward economic development in ways that deal with the complex heritage of nearly 30 years of war and internal conflict; massive population growth; and the need to create a competitive economy.
* Put Iraq’s budget on a stable path toward developing effective Iraqi security forces and government services; helping fund economic reconstruction and development; dealing with the near phaseout of international aid and continuing foreign debt and reparations issues; and reducing the dependence of the government on uncertain levels of oil export earnings for the majority of its revenues.

The Need for a Strategic Partnership

The Burke Chair has conducted a study of these challenges, Iraq’s ability to meet them, and the need for an enduring strategic partnership in which the US continues to help Iraq improve its security, governance, and economy. This study is titled “Iraq: Creating a Strategic Partnership” and can be found on the CSIS web site at: http://csis.org/files/publication/09121 ... script.pdf

The study shows that Iraq faces serious immediate problems in each area, but all of the above challenges are “structural” in the sense that they require major changes in Iraq’s present politics, governance, security structure, and economy that will take years to accomplish. This does not mean Iraq cannot make progress much earlier, and it already has in many areas. The scale of each challenge, however, is too great for such progress to quickly reach the point of lasting success. History takes time in Iraq, as it does everywhere else in the world.

This makes any current claims of “victory”—or successful “reconstruction”—premature and dangerous. It is far too early to say that Iraq can achieve lasting security and stability, maintain a pluralistic form of government, or avoid becoming caught up in another violent round of internal or regional power struggles.

Iraq’s success will depend largely on Iraq’s leaders and their decisions. Iraq is now a fully sovereign state that is rapidly assuming responsibility for every aspect of its policy and security. The United States can, however, play a constructive role in helping Iraq as it reduces its aid programs and withdraws its forces.

The US-Iraqi Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) provides a potential framework to build upon that can serve as a good starting point for the United States and Iraq to build up in order to meet both nations’ strategic interests. It also provides a mechanism through which the US can help Iraq during the critical period in which it chooses a new government, increases its petroleum exports and national income, deals with remaining elements of insurgency and internal conflict, and develops the capabilities necessary to deter any threat from its neighbors.

In fact, unless the US does make effective use of the agreement to help Iraq during the withdrawal of its forces between 2010 and 2011 and provides effective aid and advice during the critical transition period that follows, it runs a serious risk of seeing Iraq fail in terms of political accommodation, in developing effective governance and security forces, and in creating a climate where Iraq the GOI can begin to fund its own economic development. The result could be an Iraq too weak and too divided to achieve either security or stability, and one that becomes a new source of risk during regional tensions and power struggles.

The Challenge of Continuing Violence

Security remains a key challenge even though Iraq has made real progress in defeating the insurgency and moving toward political accommodation. The level of violence in Iraq is sharply lower than the levels that peaked in 2007. It is now dropping below the average levels that existed at the beginning of the insurgency in 2004, and most of the violence related to the Sunni insurgency is now concentrated in Baghdad and in Diyala, Ninewa, and Salah ad Din provinces in central and northern Iraq. The threat posed by the militia of Moqtada al-Sadr, by various Shi‘ite factions like the Special Groups, and by other Shi‘ite militias is far lower than at the beginning of 2008, and the Sadr faction is now part of the Shi‘ite political alliance. Fears that U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq’s cities in June 2009 would trigger new rounds of internal violence have so far proved to be sharply exaggerated.

Iraq, however, is anything but secure if being “secure” means reducing violence to levels that allow civil society and the economy to function without bombings and other large-scale incidents of violence, and reducing all of those threats to a level that largely eliminates the risk of new outbreaks of major ethnic and sectarian violence. Al Qa‘ida in Iraq (AQI), other Sunni Islamist factions, and various neo-Ba‘athist groups still carry out bombings and targeted attacks in parts of the country, and insurgent groups continue to try to trigger a new round of Sunni-Shi‘ite fighting. Since April 2009, these attacks have included a series of large-scale bombings seeking to exploit the divisions between Shi‘ite and Sunni and between Arab and Kurd, and to provoke a new round of civil conflict and sectarian and ethnic reprisals.

The Sadr militia, or “Mahdi Army,” has fragmented into a mix of largely ineffective factions, and its influence and capabilities have continued to diminish. The main Sadrist movement seems focused on politics rather than violence, and Sadr has done little to revitalize his militia’s military capabilities since it was defeated by the Iraqi Army’s operations in Basra and Sadr City in early 2008. However, there are still violent “special groups” that have splintered from the Mahdi Army and that attack U.S. and Iraqi government targets. Iran still provides some supplies and training for such groups, as well as some support and training to both the Sadr and Supreme Council militias.

The decline in the Sunni Jihadist and Sadrist threats, however, has not eliminated internal political tensions that could trigger new forms of violence. These include serious tensions between Iraqi Arabs, Kurds, Turkmans, and other minorities in the north. Arab and Kurdish tensions are now the most serious near-term threat to Iraqi stability, and they involve political struggles over control of a broad band of disputed territory—from Mosul to the Iranian border in the area just south of Kurdistan, as well as over control of the nation’s petroleum reserves and government revenue.

These internal threats interact with problems in Iraqi politics and governance. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and others have exploited Iraqi nationalism in their search for political support in the March 2010 national election. This has restricted the role the United States can play in dealing with the insurgency and preventing clashes between Iraq’s various factions, although the bombings since June 2009—and Kurdish-Arab tensions—have revitalized some aspects of U.S.-Iraqi security cooperation. At the same time, Prime Minister Maliki may be taking excessive risks in rushing reductions in security barriers to show that Iraq is more secure than it is, and in failing to act more decisively to reduce Arab-Kurdish tensions and deal with Sunni sensitivities over issues like the treatment of the Sons of Iraq (SoI). Politics are not a substitute for effective security measures.

It is unlikely that the United States and Iraq can deal with these issues and shape a more lasting security structure as part of their strategic partnership until a new Iraqi government is elected and formed as a functioning entity. Time will also be a problem. Even a fully successful election in March 2010 is unlikely to create a new, fully appointed Iraqi government until June. It could easily take until late 2010 before a new Iraqi government could agree on its policies, shape a budget, and create a functioning government in key ministries like the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior

This can pose major problems both in terms of how well the Iraqi government responds to its security problems over the next year, and in creating a more lasting security arrangement as part of a functional strategic partnership. There are substantial lead times in creating new forms of aid and assistance; ensuring that structures like the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are transformed into new advisory roles; and creating strong military and police advisory teams to help Iraq create military forces that can defeat the insurgency and deter outside threats and police forces that can fully support the rule of law. Major delays or failure to agree on structures that both respect Iraqi sovereignty and enable the United States to support a strategic partnership could well lead the United States to accelerate reductions in its forces and in its aid programs and could have a lasting impact on longer-term efforts to create a stable partnership.

Polls show that most Iraqis see ongoing improvements in their security but are still deeply concerned about the security outside their immediate neighborhoods. Moreover, the threat posed by insurgents and terrorists and by ethnic and sectarian tensions, is only part of the problem. Iraq must now establish a rule of law to deal with crime and extortion and provide the civil order needed for lasting political accommodation and for economic reconstruction and development.

In short, the fact that levels of violence in Iraq are significantly lower does not mean that Iraq is not still years away from lasting stability and security. In the interim, jihadists, other violent factions, and the risk of new civil conflict will pose a significant threat to the government and to the country as a whole. Iraq will need substantially more political accommodation, successful national elections and improved governance, better security forces, and greater economic realism to succeed. It will also need substantial outside security aid for at least half a decade after U.S. forces withdraw at the end of 2011—although that requirement will drop steadily with time, as Iraqi forces should be able to operate largely on their own.

Finally, Iraq and the United States must look beyond Iraq’s internal security. Iraq faces real and potential threats on all of its borders. Sunni insurgents still receive support from Syria. Iran still supports elements of various Shi‘ite militias and Shi‘ite extremists and actively seeks to influence, if not dominate, Iraq’s Shi‘ite majority.

Turkey has steadily improved its cooperation with the Kurdish government in the north, but is still deeply concerned over the presence of elements of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) near its border and the impact of Iraqi Kurdish autonomy on Turkey’s Kurds. Saudi Arabia still sees infiltration from Iraq as a threat, and the Arab states have not yet fully accepted Iraq’s Shi‘ite-led government.

Regional security will be an enduring problem for Iraq, and so it must further develop its military forces and internal security capabilities if it is to deter outside pressure and threats. At the same time, it must reach out to neighboring countries, forging relationships with those who will accept the government of Iraq as a sovereign government and cooperate with it on regional issues.

The Challenge of Political Accommodation

Public opinion polls show that the vast majority of Arab Sunnis and Arab Shi‘ites want a united Iraq. The provincial elections in early 2009 showed that Arab Sunnis participated fully in the political process and that elections could peacefully change the leadership in many provinces. However, there are still serious political tensions between every major faction in the country, and these tensions drive many of the struggles for political power in this year’s provincial elections as well as in the national elections set for early 2010. They also affect Iraq’s ability to form an effective central government during 2010 and to create an overall structure of government with effective ministries and provincial, district, and local authorities.

There are also continuing ethnic and sectarian tensions and divisions within each major faction in Iraq. The two major Kurdish political parties remain relatively united, but both are increasingly separate from any major Arab party, and minority politics are constantly shifting and often adding to Arab-Kurdish tensions. The ruling Shi’ite coalition has fractured into power struggles between the Maliki faction, other factions in the former ruling Shi’ite coalition, and the emerging Sadr faction. A similar fragmentation has led to political struggles between various Sunni factions—none of which has yet emerged as a leading voice for Sunni opinion. Some cross-sect parties have entered the political scene more recently, including Prime Minister Maliki’s new State of Law coalition, which attempts to include representatives from both Sunni and Shi‘ite parties. Most parties, however, are not truly national; even though they may include limited elements of other ethnic groups, they remain largely sectarian.

It is not yet clear whether this complex series of political struggles will create major new divisions between Sunni and Shi‘ite and Arab and Kurd, or lead to coalitions and compromises that bridge sectarian and ethnic lines. These political struggles, however, present a significant risk to political accommodation. The wounds of a half-decade of civil conflict—and decades of previous clashes and tensions—have not healed and will not heal quickly.

The Challenge of Governance

Iraq must do far more than reach political accommodation. It must create a form of governance that replaces a focus on counterinsurgency with effective governance at the central, provincial, and local levels.

Iraq’s complex political structure makes forming a central government difficult. An election in March 2010 may not lead to a new government until July of that year. Ministers will have to be chosen, and new balances will have to be established between the prime minister and other officials and between Iraq’s leaders and the Council of the Republic. The Provincial Powers act will have to be translated from theory to some form of stable practice, along with decisions about how revenues are to be allocated at the provincial level. Long-delayed legislation will need to be passed, existing legislation will have to be put into practice, and Iraq will have to establish a post-conflict rule of law. This process may well take until 2011 and several years beyond.

Iraq must create a structure of governance that is based on an equitable sharing of the nation’s wealth at a time when Iraq’s economy is still on the road to any serious recovery and growth, when foreign aid is phasing down to relatively low levels, and before the country’s petroleum sector can expand to finance the government budget and development. Even with high oil revenues, Iraq cannot expect major increases in government revenues and national income before 2014–2016 because of the volatile nature of oil prices and the amount of time it will take to build the necessary infrastructure. It must create governance that provides the day-to-day services Iraqis need, and must establish a rule of law that can deal with the local violence, crime, and corruption that underpin civil order and economic development.

Today's level of Iraqi governance is only beginning to plan and budget effectively. Corruption, waste, and bureaucratic barriers and delays are all at unacceptable levels. The transfer of responsibility for water, power, sewers, and other essential services is still problematic, and the results fall short of minimum public expectations. Planning and execution of these efforts are weak at the central, provincial, and local government levels. The central government has not yet shown that it can manage the recovery of key sectors of the economy like agriculture and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Key sectors of governance like education and public health operate at the crisis level and have declined since 2003, in spite of U.S. aid programs.

A wide range of legislation and constitutional issues affect both political accommodation and governance. Again, it seems almost certain that these issues will not be resolved until the 2010 election is over and the new national and provincial governments can show their ability to govern. The formation of a new national government will likely involve even more political struggles that will continue well beyond 2010. Creating effective provincial governments and determining how they will interact with the central government is a work in progress that is just beginning. Urban government is a major problem in several key cities, and plans for district elections have already slipped for years—with no date in sight. Creating a stable form of governance at the central, provincial, and local level will take at least half a decade.

The Challenge of Economic Development and Demographic Pressure

Economics and demographics are other major sources of instability that Iraq must now deal with on both a short-term and a structural basis. Iraq’s immense petroleum reserves and water supplies may eventually make it a wealthy county. Its recent petroleum agreements with major British, Chinese, and U.S. oil companies are an important first step. Iraq is not a wealthy country today, however, and will not be for at least a decade. It will take at least that long to transform Iraq’s resources into income, development, employment, and a proper distribution of the nation’s wealth to its people.

Iraq in 2009 Iraq ranked 162nd in the world in per capita income—far behind any other Gulf state and not far ahead of Gaza (164) and the West Bank (166). [1] Its population is extremely young and some 50–60 percent of its young men are unemployed or badly underemployed—threatening their economic and social status, their ability to marry or support a family, and Iraq’s security in the process. Those who are employed are often employed in the state sector, and in ways that are subsidized to the point they do little or nothing to build Iraq’s economy. Iraq’s educational system and public health system are grossly inadequate and near collapse. Civil society waits on full security, and income distribution not only is grossly inequitable but has been made far worse by the profiteering and corruption financed by post–2003 wartime expenditures, a failure to manage the aid process, and a combination of corrupt contractors and power brokers.

The result is that Iraq’s stability is now critically dependent on using the bulk of its national budget to create jobs and pay salaries in the state sector—almost all of which is funded through oil export revenues. According to the International Monetary Fund, crude oil export revenues represented more than 75 percent of Iraq’s GDP and 86 percent of government revenues in 2008. [2] Drops in world oil prices during the course of 2008 forced Iraq to cut its 2009 budget from $80 billion to $58.6 billion at a time it came to realize that it was both underbudgeting key expenditures like its security forces and undercosting development. Concurrently, most foreign aid was sharply reduced, as Iraq had already disbursed $46.5 billion of the $52.8 billion in U.S. aid that it had received since 2003. [3]

These oil revenues are unlikely to be high enough to fund both state sector employment and Iraq’s development for the next four to five years. Iraqi oil revenues now seem likely to be higher that some worst-case predictions made in the spring of 2009, but they will still be far lower than what Iraq needs to meet its government payroll and subsidies and to fund economic reconstruction and development. In combination with the massive drop in foreign aid, the result is that the government has had to make major cuts in funding the development of the Iraqi security forces, infrastructure and development, and operating expenses in critical areas like health and education.

These economic tensions inevitably make the Arab-Kurdish and internal Arab power struggles worse, if only because there is so much less discretionary money to help “glue” various factions together. These rifts have been deepened and extended by Iraq’s failure to pass meaningful investment laws, deal with problems like taxes and land rights, and move forward in passing oil laws and creating competitive proposals for international investment in its petroleum sector.

Moreover, Iraq’s problems go far beyond short-term problems in oil revenues and a budget crisis. Much of its infrastructure is aging or damaged. Moreover, its economy and infrastructure have never grown in proportion to the massive population boom that has gone on for decades and that ensures that steadily larger numbers of young men and women will enter a stagnant labor force in the foreseeable future.

In fact, Iraq has not been able to move toward any form of stable economic development since it effectively went bankrupt early in the Iran-Iraq War in 1982. It has deep structural problems in its agricultural, industrial, and service sectors compounded by decades of state mismanagement. Iraq already faces a crisis in agriculture as result of years of drought, decades of state mismanagement and underinvestment, and population growth that sharply exceeds what the agricultural sector can productive employ.

Iraq’s past failure to aggressively rehabilitate and expand its petroleum sector will undercut its economic recovery and development for at least several more years, and exacerbate its political tensions. Moreover, Iraq must move beyond “reconstruction” to create policies and goals that deal with its growing population, the need for far better distribution of income, and the need to create an economy that has a high degree of regional, ethnic, and sectarian equity. Economic development cannot be separated from political accommodation and demographic realities.

Redefining Iraqi-U.S. Relations and Creating an Iraqi-led Partnership

Iraq is now a fully sovereign state and is steadily reducing the remnants of its dependence on U.S. forces and aid. Its domestic politics reflect both a desire for independence and a level of anger and distrust at the United States for its invasion and occupation, which together create strong pressures to accelerate the process of reducing its dependence. This means, however, that Iraq must take the lead in meeting the country’s challenges, and must do so through positive and effective action. It must not fall into the trap of third-world impotence—complaining about the past and trying to export blame or responsibility to other states. No one should forget history, but only Iraq can shape Iraq’s present and future. Iraq can only succeed to the extent it helps itself.

The United States has responsibilities of its own, as well as vital national security interests to serve. It must now redefine every aspect of its relationship with Iraq. It must act immediately to complete the shift from the role an occupier to that of a strategic partner, where it is clear to both sides that Iraq is the lead. In the process, the United States must complete a shift in leadership away from the Department of Defense, focused on armed nation building, to an initiative led by the State Department, focused on aid, advice, and support for the Iraqi government.

This process cannot be complete before U.S. military forces withdraw from Iraq at the end of 2011, and the United States must find ways to provide aid in the form of an integrated civil-military effort that creates a new U.S. mix of civil and military advisers and a new approach to aid that helps Iraq make the transition to full management and funding of its own programs. Given Iraq’s current needs and national budget, and its economic problems the U.S. aid effort may well have to continue for half a decade. It will be particularly important to handle the transition from dependence on U.S. forces and aid during the critical period between 2012 and 2014 and to ensure that Iraq can make a “soft landing” from this dependence.

Both Iran and the United States need to recognize that they can benefit from translating their Strategic Framework Agreement into programs that help ensure Iraq’s security and development. This requires a new form of partnership where Iraq is firmly in the lead and in control but where both nations work together toward Iraq becoming a nation that can play a major role in ensuring the stability of the Gulf and the world’s energy supplies.

Iraq has every reason to ensure that its sovereignty is fully respected and that Iraqis alone shape and determine Iraq’s future. At the same time, Iraq needs to recognize that it needs continuing U.S. aid and advice in developing its security forces and its economy. Much will depend on how realistic Iraqis are willing to be in recognizing these needs, communicating them to the United States, and seeking U.S. aid in time to get the U.S. action that it is needed.

The Need for a Strong U.S. Aid Team and Continuing Aid

Americans also need to understand how important such a strategic partnership will be, and that it is well worth maintaining enough aid to ensure a “victory” in the form of a stable and secure Iraq. Much will depend on how quickly the United States shows Iraq that it is a responsible strategic partner, how well it respects Iraqi sovereignty and leadership, and how willing it is to provide continuing aid and support.

As noted, this does not mean maintaining the expenditure levels of past years or continuing such aid indefinitely. The United States has already reduced aid far below earlier levels provided since 2003, and it is committed to reducing its troop levels to no more than 50,000 by mid-2010 and to eliminating its military presence by the end of 2012. These reductions are positive steps in fully restoring Iraq’s sovereignty, but they also pose serious risks to Iraq’s security and stability unless the United States finds ways to continue to assist Iraq during the critical transition period between 2010 and 2014.

While the U.S. Embassy and U.S. experts are still assessing the levels of aid required, it is clear that Iraq requires as strong a civilian and military U.S. advisory and aid mission as Iraqi governments are willing to accept. It will be at least half a decade before the U.S. Embassy in Iraq can become anything approaching a “normal” embassy. If the Iraqi government will accept such arrangements, the United States should seek to provide an embassy with a strong civilian aid team to help Iraq improve its governance, economic development, police, and rule of law. This aid effort should be supported by consulates that can provide local aid in critical areas in the north and south, and it should preserve a modified form of provincial reconstruction team to help Iraq at the provincial and local level.

U.S. experts have suggested creating a consulate in Irbil in the Kurdish area in the north, and one in Basra, which will be a key center for the Shi’ite provinces in the south as well as a national economic center. They have also suggested that much smaller numbers of a new form of local aid and advisory team should replace the present Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These would include aid teams in sensitive areas like Ninewa, Kirkuk, Diyala, Anbar, and Najaf—areas where Iraq is likely to have significant security and stability problems well into 2015 and beyond.

The United States cannot be a partner and interfere in Iraqi internal affairs. It must not attempt to impose its own approach to governance, economic development, police, and rule of law, and it should encourage international organizations like the United Nations and World Bank to play a strong role wherever possible. It is also clear that the United States cannot and should not provide major reconstruction aid at a time when Iraq must make its own decisions and learn to use its limited resources in ways that offer sustainable paths toward development.

There are, however, many areas where the United States can provide technical advice and improved planning and budgeting systems, encourage U.S. and other foreign investment, and help Iraq emerge from the nearly constant state of war and crisis it has experienced since 1980. There will be many cases where limited amounts of grant aid can help Iraqis do their own planning, become more efficient and competitive internationally, and understand the best ways to attract foreign investment and make the critical conversion from military and paramilitary security to normal policing and the rule of law. There also are crises in Iraq’s current public services—like health and education—that the United States has largely failed to address in the past and where even limited aid can help Iraq deal with critical social and humanitarian needs.

At the military and police levels, the Iraqi security forces cannot possibly reach the minimum level of capability they need to provide security and stability before U.S. forces fully withdraw by December 31, 2011. The United States must be prepared to offer Iraq a strong and highly capable U.S. military assistance staff and an equally strong State Department effort to aid the police. Until it massively expands its oil exports in the period after 2015, Iraq will also need funds to improve the size and quality of its forces.

The United States should not encourage Iraq to expand its forces to levels it cannot afford to sustain and does not need. However, U.S. Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) and Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I) experts are almost certainly correct in estimating that major additional aid will be necessary both during the period before U.S. withdrawal and for several years thereafter. Combined with a limited civil aid program in other areas, the total could range from $6 billion to $10 billion during the period between FY2010 and FY2014. It would not be cheap, but as the past has made all too clear, it would be far cheaper than an unstable and insecure Iraq.

Such an effort is essential to helping Iraq reach the level of security and stability it has lacked since the late 1970s. It also is essential to serving U.S. strategic interests. A strong and stable Iraq will be a major bulwark against Iran without threatening Iran or serving as a new source of tension. Iraq will have no reason to return to the regional ambitions and tensions that have helped destabilize the Persian Gulf region since the British withdrawal in the 1960s. It can play a constructive role in resolving Kurdish tensions in the region, and it can serve as a moderate actor in dealing with Arab-Israeli tensions and searching for a stable peace. Expanding Iraq’s oil industry to its full potential can help bring down oil prices and ensure the stability of a global economy that is as critical to the United States as to any direct importer of Gulf oil.

This is a critical mix of U.S. national strategic objectives. Success in achieving them is well worth the limited cost of continued American support. Failure will mean that the U.S.-led invasion of 2003 will have turned from a military victory to a grand strategic defeat. History has shown us that nations will remember how an occupying or invading country left, and what it left behind, for decades after its departure. The United States cannot change the past, but it can help shape the future.